While design decisions determine the quality and viability of applications in general, in Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), the decision for a suitable DLT design (e.g., Ethereum, IOTA) is of particular relevance because the retroactive change of the underlying DLT design is currently very hard and often even impossible. Extant research has revealed several trade-offs between DLT characteristics (e.g., availability vs. consistency). Such trade-offs inhibit a one-size-fits-all DLT design that suites the requirements of all applications on DLT. For an appropriate assessment of the suitability of DLT designs for a particular application on DLT, researchers and developers require a systematic and holistic overview of the functioning of different DLT designs, including their configuration of DLT characteristics as well as dependencies and resulting trade-offs between DLT characteristics. In this work, we present a comprehensive set of 49 DLT characteristics synthesized from the literature on DLT, which have been found relevant to consider when developing viable applications on DLT. Furthermore, we conducted an in-depth analysis of dependencies and resulting trade-offs between DLT characteristics. Finally, we consolidated the identified 26 trade-offs into 6 archetypes and explain implications for applications on DLT.
Introduction
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) has the potential to increase efficiency and transparency of collaborations between individuals and/or organizations [17, 86, 131] and, thus, significantly impacts economy, society, and everyday life. So far, applications on DLT have been developed in various domains such as finance [23] , health care [30] , and supply chain management [149] . For instance, in supply chain management, provenance tracking systems for diverse products employ DLT as a tamper-resistant data storage, which is replicated across multiple storage devices (nodes) of cooperating entities in the supply chain [89, 93] . Each application on DLT builds upon a particular DLT design with unique characteristics (e.g., Ethereum [22] or IOTA [127] ), which is a detailed description of a DLT concept (e.g., blockchain) [78] . A DLT design is used as a shared infrastructure and affords, for example, reliable, (almost) immutable data storage, real-time processing of transactions (e.g., for the transfer of digital assets), and automation of business processes [103, 155, 171, 171] . However, recent implementations of applications on DLT emphasize critical drawbacks of underlying DLT designs, which, for instance, result in low throughput, poor scalability, or high cost. To address these issues, developers and researchers reconfigured several DLT characteristics (e.g., block size, block creation interval) of DLT designs and investigated the respective impact on the behavior of the distributed ledger to better understand and tackle prevalent drawbacks of DLT designs for applications on DLT [53] . During prior studies, researchers revealed several dependencies between DLT characteristics in particular, such as block size and block creation interval, that must be considered for the implementation of DLT applications [78] . Such dependencies often result in trade-offs between DLT characteristics in a way that the improvement of a particular DLT characteristic impairs other DLT characteristics. For example, a trade-off exists between achieving availability and consistency [18] . High availability of the distributed ledger can be achieved by increasing the number of replications of the ledger. As a consequence, the network size of the distributed ledger increases, which will lead to impaired consistency due to longer propagation delays for network messages [54] . Due to prevalent trade-offs between DLT characteristics, there will not be a one-size-fits-all DLT design for applications on DLT but rather DLT designs that are specialized to fulfill certain requirements and agree on a set of trade-offs [78, 173] . This makes it challenging for DLT developers to select fitting DLT designs for particular applications. It is necessary for developers to understand the drawbacks caused by trade-offs in DLT designs in advance because the choice of a DLT design strongly influences development, maintenance, and viability of the respective application on DLT. The high efforts to migrate data stored on a distributed ledger from one DLT design to another DLT design [114] make the decision of which DLT design fulfills the application requirements best even more crucial for the correct and viable functioning of envisioned applications on DLT (e.g., provenance tracking, electronic health records). Therefore, a sound understanding of possible drawbacks for a particular application on DLT, which are caused by the choice of a DLT design and the inherent trade-offs, is required to ensure viability of an envisioned application on DLT. To understand the trade-offs between DLT characteristics that cause the restricted applicability of DLT designs to use cases and for the efficient reconfiguration and development of DLT designs, a comprehensive analysis of dependencies between DLT characteristics and resulting tradeoffs is required. Yet, while practitioners and prior research have started to identify dependencies between DLT characteristics, we lack an understanding on the (negative) influence of dependencies on other DLT characteristics (e.g., integrity, traceability) and the resulting trade-offs. The impact of reconfigurations of DLT characteristics on the behavior of the respective DLT design remains unclear. Hence, we answer the following research question (RQ):
RQ: How do trade-offs between DLT characteristics impact the viability of applications on DLT?
To answer our RQ, we first conducted a comprehensive literature review to identify DLT characteristics and related dependencies between DLT characteristics. Then, we analyzed contradicting dependencies between DLT characteristics to identify trade-offs, which we further investigated to deepen understanding of the causes for drawbacks for applications on DLT. Finally, we consolidated the identified trade-offs into archetypes to make the resulting drawbacks for applications on DLT more tangible. This work presents a consolidated list of 49 DLT characteristics that are fundamental for assessing the viability of DLT designs for applications on DLT. We further explain trade-offs between DLT characteristics, which inhibit a one-size-fits-all DLT design. Based on the identified dependencies and trade-offs between DLT characteristics, we discuss drawbacks for applications on DLT and, thus, contribute to the development of viable applications on DLT. Finally, we present seven archetypes of DLT designs to make the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics and resulting drawbacks for applications on DLT more comprehensible. This work forms a bridge between currently separated research streams on DLT such as technical analysis, use cases identification, and decision support in the choice of a DLT design. We support an understanding of drawbacks for applications on DLT that result from the choice of a certain configuration of DLT characteristics. Thus, practitioners and researchers can better assess drawbacks of applications on DLT caused by the selected DLT designs. Furthermore, we link currently distinct research streams in the field of DLT (e.g., technical analysis and application development). Thus, we contribute to scientific knowledge by making it possible to set DLT characteristics into relation with applications on DLT and vice versa. The manuscript is structured as follows. First, we introduce the current state of research on DLT and set our research into context. In doing so we outline several attacks on distributed ledgers and smart contract vulnerabilities because this knowledge is required to understand the particular relevance of trade-offs between DLT characteristics and drawbacks for applications on DLT. Second, we describe the applied methodology. Third, we present the identified DLT characteristics, the derived trade-offs between DLT characteristics, and the generated archetypes. Fourth, we discuss our principle findings, summarize the implications for both practice and research, discuss research limitations, and give an outlook for future research.
Related Research

Distributed Ledger Technology
DLT enables the operation of a highly-available, append-only database (referred to as distributed ledger) in an untrustworthy environment [167] , where separated storage devices (referred to as nodes) maintain a local replication of the data stored on the ledger. An untrustworthy environment is characterized by the arbitrary occurrence of Byzantine failures [88] such as crashed or (temporarily) unreachable nodes, network delays, and malicious behavior of nodes (i.e., issuing wrong information). DLT serves as a shared, digital infrastructure for applications on DLT (e.g., financial transactions [77] , provenance tracking [89] ). Nodes are maintained and, thus, controlled by individuals or organizations, which we consider node controllers in the following. In DLT, data is transferred and appended to the ledger in the form of transactions and stored in a chronologically-ordered sequence. Each transaction contains meta-data (e.g., receiver address, timestamp) and a digital representation of certain assets or program code of a smart contract (see chapter 2.2) [22] . When a node receives a new transaction, the transaction is validated. The validation incorporates a proof of ownership for the particular asset (i.e., coins), which is why digital signatures and public key cryptography is applied [22, 109] . For example, as a transaction, Alice has sent a certain amount of coins, which is validated by Bob's node. After a transaction has been found valid, the transaction is forwarded to all adjacent nodes, which also validate and forward the transaction subsequently. In this way a transaction is disseminated across nodes of a distributed ledger until each node eventually received the transaction. DLT draws from the concept of Replicated State Machines (RSMs), where each node maintains a local replication of the ledger in a certain state sn with an incrementing counter n ∈ ℕ0, which expresses the height of a ledger (also called block height in blockchain). Appending new data to the local replication of the ledger represents a transition from a state sn to the subsequent state sn+1. For example, if Alice owns 10 coins in sn and she sends 2 coins to Bob, Alice initiates a transition from sn to sn+1, in which Alice has a new balance of 8 coins and Bob's balance is increased by 2 coins. Since all nodes of a distributed ledger maintain a local replication of the ledger, all nodes must be synchronized and agree on a common state of the distributed ledger to reach consistency (i.e., agreeing that Bob's balance increased). For this purpose a consensus mechanism is employed [109, 110] . A consensus mechanism is used to manage the negotiation between nodes, which eventually agree on a common state of the ledger. Consensus mechanisms build upon trust models, which consider threats and uncertainties in the process of consensus finding such as Byzantine failures. Trust models form a set of assumptions, which must hold to assure consensus finding among nodes (e.g., at least 51 % of nodes must agree on a certain state). In large-scale distributed ledgers (e.g., Bitcoin [109] ), where nodes can join and leave the network arbitrarily, it is not possible to reach consensus among all nodes before new data is finally added to the ledger [124] . Thus, newly appended data is not finalized but the data cannot be altered or removed to a certain probability, which is why only probabilistic finality is given [138] . The probability of data being finalized increases as more blocks (or transactions) are appended to the distributed ledger after the particular transaction. Therefore, the trust model of DLT designs such as Bitcoin incorporates network partitions by design, in which some nodes may agree on a state sn,1 and others agree on sn,2 with sn,1 ≠ sn,2. This phenomenon of network partitions which maintain different states respectively is called a fork. There can be an arbitrary number of forks in a distributed ledger at the same time. Forks are resolved by a so called fork resolution rules (e.g., in Bitcoin the longest chain rule [109] ), which decide for a certain state of the ledger and, thus, brings the system in a consistent state. In contrast to probabilistic finality, there is total finality (or just finality), where all nodes agree on the new state before the data is appended to the ledger [24] . Once appended, data cannot be altered or removed anymore and forks such as in Bitcoin [109] or Ethereum [22] are unlikely or even not possible. DLT covers various DLT concepts, DLT designs, DLT properties and DLT characteristics [63, 78] . For illustration of our terminology in DLT, we present a hierarchical structure of the important DLT terms in Figure 1 . DLT concepts describe the basic structure and functioning of DLT designs in an abstract way. For instance, blockchain is a concept describing the usage of linked blocks that form a chain. Each block contains multiple transactions that have been added into the block by the nodes. Other DLT concepts do not use blocks at all; instead, for example, the DLT concept blockDAG links generated blocks in a directed acyclic graph (DAG), while in a transaction-based DAGs (TDAG) transactions are linked directly with each other 1 . DLT designs extend the abstract description of DLT concepts by adding concrete values and processes for inherent DLT characteristics such as a maximum block size. There are significant differences between DLT designs that make DLT designs suitable for some applications and unsuitable for others. For instance, the DLT design Bitcoin creates a new block every 10 minutes and comes at a block size of 1 MB [109] . In contrast, the DLT design Ethereum publishes new blocks every 17 seconds while block size is determined by a fee (so called gas) for executing transactions. The fee is voted up or down by each node individually. Each DLT design shares the same DLT properties, which are groups of DLT characteristics. For instance, throughput and scalability are both associated with the DLT property performance. Although all DLT designs cover all DLT properties, DLT designs must not cover all DLT characteristics. For instance, TDAGs do not use blocks and do not feature any DLT characteristics related to blocks (e.g., block size, block creation interval). In public, unpermissioned DLT designs such as Bitcoin [109] , there is an incentive mechanism, which employs a reward scheme for nodes that participate in the validation of blocks and transaction, consenus finding, and maintainance of the distributed ledger. For example, nodes in the Bitcoin network receive a certain amount of coins if they have first mined a valid new block. The participation of nodes in a distributed ledger to receive a reward is called mining. Accordingly, the validating nodes are referred to as miners. Such incentive mechanisms are predominantly applied to distributed ledgers that employ nodes of unknown node controllers and, thus, allow for a high level of decentralization. A distributed ledger's level of decentralization is determined by two dimensions: the number of independent node controllers (e.g., companies, individuals) and the number of validating nodes (see Figure 2) . Despite the widespread distinction between public and permissioned DLT design (e.g., [102, 121] ) or public, consortium, and private DLT design (e.g., [169] ), we use a more granular terminology to make the trade-offs in the following chapter unambiguous (in line with [158] ). Thus, we distinguish between public and private DLT designs depending on the fact if a new node can directly join a network (referred to as public DLT) or if a permission must be granted first (referred to as private DLT). Public and private DLT designs can be distinguished into unpermissioned and permissioned. Nodes can either all have the same permission or must first be granted permission to validate and commit new data, usually both at the same time. The used terminology is summarized in Table 1. In Bitcoin, the first Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus mechanism was presented, which could be applied in a large scale, the PoW-based Nakamoto Consensus [109] . Nevertheless, Nakamoto Consensus comes with several drawbacks such as poor throughput, exhaustive energy consumption, and vulnerability to attacks on integrity (see chapter 2.4.1). To overcome these drawbacks of the Nakamoto Consensus, numerous alternative consensus mechanisms have been developed and already applied to DLT designs such as GoChain [56] , Hyperledger Fabric [4] , and Tendermint [2] . The relevant consensus mechanisms for this work are summarized in Table 2 . Due to the fact that the explanation of the mentioned consensus mechanisms is not in the scope of this work, we invite the reader to refer to the provided references to obtain detailed information on the technical details.
Smart Contracts
Several distributed ledgers offer the possibility to deploy and execute customized business logics through socalled smart contracts. Smart contracts are software programs, which are developed in either basic OP_CODE (e.g., in Bitcoin Script language) [32, 66] or even in high level programming languages (e.g., Java, Python, Solidity), which allow for Turing completeness [22, 43, 67] . When Bitcoin was invented, the development of smart contracts was limited to the use of cryptographic functions such as hashlocks, timelocks, and multisignatures. These functions can be used to formalize conditions to unlock and access stored assets (e.g., [62] ).
To give more flexibility to developers to implement more expressive smart contracts, the Ethereum foundation developed the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) that allows for the execution of Turing complete smart contracts, which can be developed in the high level language Solidity [22] . A smart contract in Ethereum is contained in a transaction, which is sent to and eventually stored on the Ethereum blockchain. A unique address is generated for the smart contract, which represents an account, which is managed by the smart contract. The smart contract can be called via this unique address to trigger targeted methods [22] . Ethereum smart contracts can store assets and issue transactions, if formalized conditions are met. Such conditions can even include data, which is not stored on the Ethereum blockchain (on-chain) because Ethereum smart contracts can retrieve data from external data sources (off-chain), so-called oracles [166] . If a smart contract is executed each node of the distributed ledger processes the smart contract individually similar to a regularly sent transaction by a user. 
Prior Research on Drawbacks of DLT Designs
Applications on DLT heavily depend on the choice of a DLT design. It is important to assess possible drawbacks stemming from the selected DLT design to achieve viability and increase maintainability of applications on DLT. As DLT combines insights from several disciplines of computer science (e.g., distributed systems and public key encryption) and game theory, DLT designs are complex and implications for applications on the respective DLT design are not trivial to derive. DLT designs come with unobvious and deeply interwoven dependencies between DLT characteristics. To evaluate the applicability of DLT and to pave the way for a common understanding of DLT much research has already been done. Extant research on DLT can be distinguished into four research streams: description, analysis, application, and guidance (see Table 3 ).
The description research stream incorporates structured descriptions and classifications of DLT, for example, taxonomies and listings of DLT characteristics. In this research stream, characteristics of and differences between DLT designs are collected and consolidated into a structured overview (e.g., [52, 160] ). However, dependencies between identified DLT characteristics are seldom investigated and the causes for the everincreasing number of DLT designs remain unclear. Hence, the practical or technical use of the identified DLT characteristics is limited to the provision of a common understanding of selected DLT designs. Implications for application development remain unclear.
In the second research stream, analysis, dependencies between selected DLT characteristics are measured and individual dependencies between DLT characteristics are reported. For example, research reports that high performance of a DLT design mostly comes at the cost of its level of security [53, 54] . Current research explains this trade-off in blockchains by the fact that various attacks result from an increased stale block rate, which is influenced, among other things, by the (mis-) configuration of block size and block creation interval in public, unpermissioned DLT designs [53, 54] . Stale blocks are mined blocks that are not used in the main branch of the blockchain, and thus remain only in forks. On the other hand, consistency is impeded due to long propagation delays [50] . However, the application perspective is not considered in prior research because most of the research articles do not explain practical implications resulting from the observed effects produced by reconfigurations of DLT characteristics. Thus, a holistic view on dependencies between DLT characteristics and resulting drawbacks is not presented in this research stream. The third research stream focuses on the application of DLT in certain domains, for example, supply chain management, health IT, or the Internet of Things. Due to the novelty of DLT, the potential for applications on DLT is still under investigation. Hence, several prototypes of applications on DLT were already developed and drawbacks due to the choice of the chosen DLT designs have been identified. For example, the Ethereum blockchain is considered to have a low throughput [68, 173] and is costly [153] for the use in applications in the field of Internet of Things [68] . The Bitcoin blockchain cannot provide confidentiality and has an even lower throughput than Ethereum [79] . IOTA, which is predominantly designed for the use in the Internet of Things, is considered to be slow when it comes to the handling of a massive amount of data points [46] . HyperLedger Fabric [4] and Ripple [133] come with high throughput but limited horizontal scalability, which is why only a comparably small number of nodes is engaged in the transaction validation [60] . The practical drawbacks caused by DLT designs are often mentioned in the literature, but the causes of the respective drawbacks are not further investigated. The forth research stream, guidance, focuses on the development of processes to guide practitioners when looking for a suitable DLT design for applications. However, the presented processes are highly abstract and [53, 54] Application Developing prototypes and investigating the application of DLT designs in certain domains [68, 173] Guidance Developing processes to guide practitioners when looking for a suitable DLT design for applications [125, 160] focus on questions related to whether a distributed ledger is necessary or not. Some articles consider selected DLT designs and conduct a comparison between the selected DLT designs but hardly address causes for the viability of investigated DLT designs for applications. Other articles address the level of decentralization, which is strongly related to the number of independently maintained validating nodes, and openness, which considers if nodes can join the distributed ledger as validators with or without verification (e.g., [125, 160] ). However, the technical fundamentals of DLT that are crucial for the viability of a DLT design for an application are only sparsely discussed. Therefore, the existing measures to evaluate viability of an underlying architecture cannot be effectively used to assess drawbacks of applications on DLT resulting from DLT designs. The mentioned four research streams provide important contributions for the generation of a holistic view on drawbacks of applications on DLT caused by the configuration of DLT characteristics. Drawbacks resulting from trade-offs between DLT characteristics deter viability for use cases and applications on DLT. Several trade-offs have been identified in multiple research articles, which make it obvious that there will not be a single DLT design fulfilling requirements of all use cases [78] . However, the research streams are separated, and it is hard to obtain a holistic overview of the implications of a DLT design for an application on DLT.
At the time of writing, the authors are only aware of one particular article that examines trade-offs in DLT [117] . However, the article is limited to the context of electronic health records and only considers blockchain. Therefore, the findings on dependencies between DLT characteristics should be synthesized to identify trade-offs and support development of applications on DLT without restriction to a particular field of application. Through the synthesis of the different research streams, the decision-making process when looking for an appropriate DLT design will be supported due to a holistic view on the origins for drawbacks of DLT designs.
Attack Vectors and Vulnerabilities
To understand drawbacks and trade-offs it is important to provide a common understanding about potential attack vectors. Therefore, we briefly review prominent attacks on DLT designs and explain smart contract vulnerabilities, which deem relevant for this work. For quick reference, we have summarized the attack vectors for DLT designs and the vulnerabilities of smart contracts in the appendices A.1 and A.2.
Attacks on DLT Designs
Despite DLT is often considered to be immutable, there have already been successful attacks on distributed ledgers that rewrote the transaction history (e.g., [134] ). In this section, we explain the most prominent attacks on the integrity of a DLT design, which play a role in the identified trade-offs. It should be noted that the explained attacks predominantly draw from forkable DLT designs (e.g., Bitcoin [109] , Ethereum [22] ).
% Attack.
A DLT design can be a victim of 51 % attacks if the applied consensus mechanism only provides probabilistic finality and relies on a majority decision among nodes. If the adversary controls the majority of nodes, she can rewrite the transaction history because the majority of nodes agrees on the fraudulent state of the distributed ledger. In DLT designs such as Bitcoin, where nodes can join and leave the network arbitrarily, mechanisms are engaged to prevent adversaries from setting up a huge number of virtual nodes to eventually reach the majority in the consensus finding. Such mechanisms usually employ PoW [74] , where nodes must first do computational work before new data can be appended to the distributed ledger.
Balance Attack. A balance attack can be defined as the process of transiently disrupting communications between subgroups of miners with equal mining power [111] . While the communication is disrupted, transactions can be submitted to one subgroup while mining new blocks in another subgroup. The attacker's aim is to outweigh the blockchain branch she submitted transactions to with the blockchain branch she participates in the mining process. As a result, the ledger may be rewritten [111] . Balance attacks raise the probability for successful double spending in forkable blockchains [111] .
Blockchain Anomaly. The blockchain anomaly considers the impossibility for the blockchain to guarantee that a committed transaction is not abortable [110] , which can finally enable double-spending. The blockchain anomaly describes the phenomenon that a transaction ti gets committed and, based on this observation, one issues a new transaction tj knowing that ti was successfully committed. Blockchains may finally discard ti and only commit tj, which violates the dependency between ti and tj. For example, Bob transfers a number of coins to Caroline (tj) given that Bob had successfully received coins from Alice (ti) before. However, once these nodes get notified of another branch of committed transactions, the fork resolution rule is applied, which eventually removes the committed transaction ti from the main branch. Later, the transaction tj is successfully committed to the main branch. Thus, the dependency between tj and ti is violated. Referring to the previous example, Bob has transferred an amount of money to Caroline (tj), although the pre-condition of the successful ti was not fulfilled as Bob did not receive money from Alice [110] . The blockchain anomaly affects mainstream blockchains whose consensus mechanism does not ensure deterministic agreement between nodes.
Bribery Attack. During a bribery attack, an adversary incentivizes validating nodes to work on a particular branch of the DLT design, which the adversary rules [15] . Thus, the number of nodes, which work on the adversary's branch, increases and may eventually catch up with the main branch of the blockchain and, finally, become the main branch.
Double Spending. Double spending is the multiple use of a particular asset by the same user for different purposes without the asset being returned [109] . In a double spending attack, the adversary suggests to a user that a product was payed, while transferring the just issued coins back to one self's wallet. After the fork was resolved, the adversary still owns her coins and the product she actually not payed for.
Eclipse Attack. In an eclipse attack, adversaries target network partitioning by delaying or blocking message forwarding (e.g., transactions) to nodes of the attacked network partition [61] . Due to the delaying or blocking of messages, certain nodes are isolated from the network. Thus, the attacking nodes monopolize the message propagation of the isolated nodes to others. Such network partitioning facilitates double spending. For example, an attacking node would send a transaction (e.g., a payment) to the victim node. The victim node validates the transaction and is, subsequently, eclipsed from the network by the attacking node. Then, the attacker issues another transaction to the entire network and, thus, spends the same assets again. As long as the victim node is isolated from the network and only receives data from the malicious nodes, the fraudulent first payment remains valid on the victim node.
Selfish-Mining. Selfish-mining attacks describe a phenomenon where a set of nodes mines their own branch of a blockchain without publishing their blocks to the main branch until their selfish-mined branch would be chosen as future main branch by the particular fork resolution rule [44, 53, 143] . A selfish mining attack is carried out by attackers to obtain excessive rewards or waste the computing power of honest miners [53] . It was found that a successful selfish-mining attack can already be performed in Bitcoin, if at least 1/3 of the miners is malicious [44] .
Long-Range Attack.
A long-range attack targets rewriting the transactions history from the genesis block (the first block in a blockchain). The new chain produced by the adversary can completely or only partially differ from the main chain. A long-range attack is successful as the adversary has generated a longer chain than the main chain, which is similar to selfish-mining [34] . However, only DLT designs, which rely on PoS as a consensus mechanism can be victim of long-range attacks because PoW-based DLT designs require too much computational effort to rewrite transaction history beginning from the genesis block, which is why LongRange Attacks are considered impractical for PoW-based DLT designs [34] .
Sybil Attack. In a sibyl attack, the adversary sets up multiple (virtual) nodes to reach majority in a consensus mechanism to eventually rewrite the transaction history of the distributed ledger. To decrease the probability of successful sibyl attacks, all nodes must perform a certain PoW, where each node must first finish a computationally hard task, which can easily be evaluated by other nodes (e.g., in Bitcoin guessing a nonce with a corresponding hash value, which at least starts with a defined number of zeroes) [74] . Sybil attacks can be performed to isolate (honest) nodes from the network by no relaying transactions of these nodes [40, 119] . The selective relaying of transactions can contribute to double spending [112] .
Routing Attacks. The previously described attacks that rely on majority decisions on the state of the distributed ledger can be successfully performed based in combination with routing attacks. In routing attacks, influence nodes or network operators to intentionally delay network messages are [7] . One such routing attack that has already been investigated in the context of DLT is called Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) hijack attack [7] .
Smart Contract Vulnerabilities
Smart contracts are of high interest in the field of DLT as they enable the development of complex applications on DLT. Nevertheless, smart contracts change several programming paradigms and, thus, come with certain issues such as error handling (e.g., rollbacks of failed transactions). Since Ethereum introduced Turing-complete smart contracts on public, unpermissioned DLT designs, the issue of how to prevent infinite loops became crucial to prevent system failure. Consequently, a pricing schedule was applied, which requires an economic equivalent (called gas) to be paid for the execution of a particular smart contract [22] . Therefore, as someone initiated the execution of a smart contract, she has to pay a certain amount of gas for it. As soon as the quantity of gas is no longer sufficient to execute a smart contract, its execution is cancelled. In this case, we speak of an out-of-gas condition. Out-of-gas conditions always demand for an appropriate error handling. Otherwise, the respective smart contracts is locked automatically and cannot be executed anymore [58] . In the chapter, we present an excerpt of smart contract vulnerabilities, which are relevant for this work.
For quick reference, we have summarized the smart contact vulnerabilities in Appendix A.1.
Overflow/Underflow Attacks. Numbers in smart contracts are usually stored in variables of the datatype unsigned integer (uint). However, there is a particularity if the stored values exceed the maximum uint value (2 256 ) because the value will circle back to zero. In underflows, the value of a uint variable undergoes zero and circles to its maximum value (2 256 ) [9, 58] . Overflow and underflow attacks exploit this particularity for different purposes such as value manipulations of payouts. To prevent overflow/underflow attacks, developers must consider if the uint value could exceed 2 256 .
Unbounded Loops. The most standard form of a gas-focused vulnerability is that of unbounded mass operations. Loops whose behavior is determined by user input could iterate too many times, exceeding the block gas limit, or becoming too economically expensive to perform. The code may not have predicted this possibility, thus failing to ensure that the contract can continue to operate as desired under these conditions. This will commonly lead to a Denial of Service for all transactions that must attempt to iterate the loop [58] .
Reentrancy. The database characteristics atomicity and sequentially of transaction execution may suggest that non-recursive functions cannot be re-entered before it is committed to a database. However, fallback mechanisms may allow an attacker to re-enter the caller function, which can produce unexpected system behavior such as loops of invocations, which eventually run into out-of-gas conditions [9, 168] . Reentrancy can occur as a single smart contract invokes itself or in a chained execution of smart contracts. In one of the most prominent incidents in the context of smart contracts, the attack on the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) [168] , reentrancy was exploited, which caused the hard fork of Ethereum into Ethereum classic and Ethereum in 2016.
Wallet Griefing. A smart contract can cause unexpected errors when invoking external functionality that may itself throw an out-of-gas exception [154] . In the widespread Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), for example, transactions are issued to an account using the <recipientAccount>.send(uint) function. Using this function to send assets can lock the smart contract if error handling is not properly implemented because the execution of <recipientAccount>.send(uint) can produce out-of-gas conditions [154] . Wallet griefing is also realistic when the smart contract should handle multiple clients without isolation and in standard practices to abort transactions as a failure in <recipientAccount>.send(uint) occurs [58] .
Methodology
To answer the RQ, we applied a three-step research approach. First, we conducted a literature review to extract DLT characteristics, where articles of all prior mentioned research streams of DLT were included. Our descriptive literature review [122] was guided by extant recommendations for literature reviews [19, 81] . Second, we analyzed the identified DLT characteristics in detail to identify trade-offs in DLT designs. Finally, we consolidated the identified trade-offs into archetypes and derived implications for and drawbacks of applications on DLT.
Literature Review
To identify publications addressing DLT characteristics, we searched scientific databases that we deemed representative for the identification of DLT characteristics and related dependencies as they cover the top computer science conferences and journals: ACM Digital Library, EBSCOhost, IEEE Xplore, ProQuest, and ScienceDirect. To cover a broad set of publications, we searched each database with the following string in title, abstracts, and keywords: (blockchain* OR (distributed AND ledger*)). We limited our search to peerreviewed articles to ensure a high quality of articles. We identified 1,144 articles in this initial search as of June 2018. To identify and filter articles, we first checked the relevance of each article by analyzing title, abstract, and keywords. If any indication for relevance appeared, the article was marked for further analysis. We excluded articles that were duplicates (62), grey literature (i.e., editorials, unfinished manuscripts, dissertations) and books (18) , not applicable to our study (56) or not available in English (31) . This first relevancy assessment resulted in a sample of 977 articles deemed to be potentially relevant. Afterwards, a fine-grained relevance validation was made by reading the articles in detail, resulting in a final sample of 191 relevant articles. In this second relevance assessment, we excluded articles that did not relate to viability of DLT characteristics for applications on DLT (710) or non-research articles (76).
Data Analysis
As a first step, we carefully read and analyzed 191 articles to identify the DLT characteristics, in particular we applied the coding rules proposed by Lacity et al. [87] . We recorded for each extracted DLT characteristic a name, a description, and the original source [87] . In total, 277 DLT characteristics were extracted. A list of so-called master variables was created to aggregate the identified DLT characteristics [87] . A master variable is an aggregation of similar DLT characteristics consisting of a master variable name and a master variable description [87] . If an identified DLT characteristic fitted into an existing master variable, we assigned it accordingly; otherwise, a new master variable was created. Since different people often put the same labels on different things and vice versa, it is crucial for the validity of a qualitative analysis to avoid semantic ambiguities. Shaw and Gaines [141] mention four possible semantic constellations: consensus (the same terminology is used for same concepts), correspondence (different terminology for same concepts), conflict (same terminology for different concepts), and contrast (different terminology for different concepts), for which we attributed in our analysis. For example, we aggregated the DLT characteristics immutability and tamper-resistance to the master variable integrity. We finalized the list of master variables by reviewing all assignments.
To ensure that we identified a reliable set of master variables, we followed researchers stressing that an important goal is to reach theoretical saturation [29, 51] regarding the emerging DLT characteristics, that is, the point when no new findings are gained in further articles. Lincoln and Guba [95: 235] speak of the term 'point of redundancy' in this context. Since no new master variable emerged in the last 27 articles identified in our literature review, we are confident to have reached saturation. To ease understanding, we use the term DLT characteristics for the identified master variables in the following as they represent an aggregation of similar DLT characteristics. We applied an inductive approach grouping DLT characteristics into DLT properties under consideration of their particular objectives and application contexts. For instance, DLT characteristics were grouped into the DLT property security if they were related to common security topics such as availability and confidentiality.
As a third step, we extracted dependencies between DLT characteristics, which have been described in the examined research articles (e.g., [52] ) or in extent research on distributed systems (e.g., [18, 45] ). In parallel, we already coded trade-offs between DLT characteristics, which are explained in the particular articles (e.g., [54, 78, 117] ). Subsequently, we synthesized the identified dependencies between DLT characteristics (e.g., more replications of the stored data increase availability) and derived trade-offs between DLT characteristics based on the identified dependencies between DLT characteristics (e.g., more replications increase the latency until consistency among all nodes is reached). Based on the extracted DLT characteristics, drawbacks for applications on DLT that are caused by the underlying DLT design were derived under consideration of common quality criteria in the field of software quality assessment [72] . Then, we consolidated the identified DLT properties and dependencies between DLT characteristics into one DLT archetype per DLT property ending up with seven DLT archetypes. Based on the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics and the generated archetypes, we derived drawbacks for applications on DLT that come from the choice of the employed DLT design. The derived drawbacks are consolidated by existing applications on DLT and the respectively underlying DLT designs.
Results
DLT Characteristics
The analysis of the relevant articles revealed 49 DLT characteristics that are relevant for the assessment of a DLT design's viability for an application on DLT. As this articles focusses on trade-offs, the 49 DLT characteristics are briefly presented and defined in Table 5 and Table 6 . The inductive grouping of the identified 49 DLT characteristics resulted in a final set of 7 DLT properties, which are presented in Table 4 . The engagement and size of the community involved with the continued development of the DLT design.
Developer Support Assistance (e.g., documentation, forums) offered by the community or foundation to answer questions with respect to deployment and operation of applications on the DLT design.
Incentive Mechanisms
The structures in place to motivate contribution of resources (e.g., computing power) for DLT design operation.
Network Size
The number of nodes participating in a DLT design.
Flexibility Interoperability
The ability to communicate between DLT designs and with other external services from a DLT design.
Maintainability
The degree of effectiveness and efficiency with which a DLT design can be kept operational.
Modularity
The logical partitioning of a DLT design into smaller components to facilitate implementation, updates, and change management, among others.
Smart Contract Support
The degree to which the DLT design supports the integration, development, and testing of smart contracts.
Token Purposes
The possible uses of tokens within a DLT design (e.g., security token, utility token, stable coin).
Transaction Size Limit
The existence and measure of a fixed maximum storage size of a transaction.
The degree to which an independent third party (e.g., state institution, certification authority) can assess the technical functionality and stored data of a DLT design.
Censorship Resistance
The probability that a transaction in a DLT design will be intentionally aborted or processed with malicious modifications.
Compliance
The alignment of DLT design characteristics and operation with regulatory requirements.
Governance Mechanisms
The existence of control mechanisms (e.g., decision rights and accountabilities) to ensure desirable behavior of DLT design users (e.g., customers, miners).
Liability
The existence of a real or juridical person that can be subjected to litigation with respect to the DLT design.
Performance Block Creation Interval
The time between the creation of consecutive blocks (only in DLT designs using blocks).
Block Size
The size of data that can be stored in a block (only in DLT designs using blocks).
Confirmation Latency
The time until sufficient subsequent transactions have been added to a distributed ledger so that the likelihood of future transaction manipulation becomes negligible.
History Retention
The maximum number of transactions that can be maintained by a DLT design.
Resource Efficiency The computational efforts required to operate a DLT design (e.g., transaction validation or block creation).
Message Propagation Efficiency
The time, bandwidth, and number of connections required to propagate transactions (or blocks) through the network.
Propagation Delay
The time between the submission of a transaction (or block) and its recipience by all nodes.
Response Time
The time between sending a transaction and receiving feedback from a DLT design.
Scalability
The capability of a DLT design to efficiently handle decreasing or increasing amounts of required resources (e.g., of transactions per second).
Throughput
The maximum number of transactions that can be appended to a DLT design in a given time interval.
Transaction Validation Latency
The time required for verifying the validity of a transaction.
Transparency Traceability
The extent to which transactions can be traced chronologically in a DLT design.
Transaction Content Visibility
The ability to publicly view a user account's holdings and transactions in a DLT design.
Unidentifiability
The degree of difficulty of mapping an account to real identities in a DLT design.
Node Verification
The extent to which nodes are verified prior to joining a distributed ledger.
Trade-Offs between DLT Characteristics
In the following, we present the 26 identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics.
A. Flexibility vs. Performance
A.1. Smart Contract Support vs. Required Bandwidth
The use of oracles (off-chain data feeds) in smart contracts enables more flexibility in defining the conditions that must be fulfilled before the smart contract issues transactions. Each time a smart contract is triggered, every node executes the smart contract. If an oracle is requested from a smart contract, the oracle receives requests from every node. Thus, an oracle can become a performance bottleneck as the oracles' bandwidth may be not enough for the number of almost simultaneous requests by nodes.
A.2. Smart Contract Support vs. Transaction Validation Speed
Support for more expressive programming languages (i.e., C++, Java, or Solidity) enables the development of smart contracts that offer a broad range of functionality. The more functionality is added to a smart contract, the higher becomes its runtime complexity. Ultimately, this impedes performance because of the increased execution time for smart contracts. Consequently, the time required for transaction validation increases [31] . Compilation of the smart contract code further influences execution time as can be seen, for The assurance that transactions are either completely executed or not executed.
Authentication
The degree to which the correctness of particular data, which is stored on a distributed ledger, can be verified.
Availability
The probability that a distributed ledger is operating correctly at any point in time.
Confidentiality
The degree to which unauthorized access to data is prevented.
Consistency
The homogeneity of data stored by all nodes participating in a DLT design.
Durability
The property of a database that data, which was once committed to the ledger, will not be lost.
Fault Tolerance
The degree to which a DLT design continues to operate correctly even if transactions (or blocks) are dropped (or delayed) or if nodes fail.
Integrity
The degree to which transactions stored on the distributed ledger are protected against unauthorized (or unintended) modification or deletion.
Isolation
The property of a database that transactions do not impact each other during their execution.
Level of Decentralization
The number of independent node controllers participating in transaction validation and consensus finding.
Node Trust Level
The trustworthiness of nodes participating in a DLT design.
Non-Repudiation
The difficulty of denying participation in transactions.
Reliability
The period of time during which a distributed ledger is correctly functioning.
Stale Block Rate
The number of blocks in a period of time that have been mined but not appended to the distributed ledger (only in DLT designs using blocks).
Strength of Encryption
The difficulty of breaking cryptographic algorithms employed by the DLT design.
Usability
Cost Financial resources required for the implementation and operation of a DLT design.
Ease of Node Setup The ease of configuring and adding a new or crashed node to the DLT design.
Ease of Use
The simplicity of accessing and working with a DLT design.
Support for Constrained Devices
The extent to which devices with limited computing capabilities (e.g., small sensors), can participate in a DLT design.
example, in C++, where developers can decide to apply static or dynamic linking for certain structures in the program code.
B. Flexibility vs. Security
B.1. Maintainability vs. Availability
Maintainability of distributed ledgers is crucial to assure security and correct functioning. During maintenance, software updates are proposed for the distributed ledger, which should be performed on the clients on each node by the responsible node controller. To assure security and compatibility with other nodes of the same distributed ledger, each validating node should run the latest client software. Otherwise, hard forks can occur due to backward incompatibility of the applied protocol, which lead to permanent splits of the distributed ledgers [80, 168] . Maintainability of distributed ledgers decreases as its number of separately controlled nodes increases, which in turn increases the distributed ledger's level of decentralization (see Figure 2 ) [160] . When maintainability of a distributed ledger is decreased, development flexibility is deteriorated and, consequently, overall security of the distributed ledger could be decreased due to, for example, hard forks or missed fixes. In Bitcoin [109] and LiteCoin, for example, it has taken weeks to agree on updates such as the adoption of Segregated Witness (SegWit) and SegWit2x [115] . The execution of these updates on the majority of nodes took even longer. Nevertheless, especially public, unpermissioned DLT designs come with a level of redundancy beyond what is possible with traditional distributed databases. Therefore, especially public, unpermissioned DLT designs come with high availability and reliability. However, maintenance-related efforts increase due to the additional efforts when applying new client updates. The dependency between maintenance-related cost and the network size of the distributed ledger is also known as blockchain bloat or DLT bloat [129] .
B.2. Maintainability vs. Integrity
Viable applications require efficient maintenance to allow adoption to changing requirements [84] . Applications on DLT share a DLT design as a digital infrastructure, which provides a high level of integrity. Integrity of a public, unpermissioned DLT design is increased as the level of decentralization increases. Thus, both dimensions of the level of decentralization (number of independent node controllers and number of validating nodes with equal permissions) influence a distributed ledger's level of integrity [42, 44] . Nevertheless, updates for the client protocol of the shared backend must be performed on each node individually, which is why maintenance of applications on DLT becomes hard as the distributed ledger provides a high level of decentralization. Integrity of a distributed ledger also impacts applications on DLT as once deployed smart contracts cannot be maintained like common program code [27] . Smart contracts must always be redeployed and initialized with the state of the obsolete version. Because the address of a smart contract must be updated for any module of the application that uses the smart contract, the stored smart contract addresses must be adapted in any frontends and chained smart contracts that reference the deprecated smart contract. As a consequence, less decentralized, public networks of distributed ledgers come with decreased integrity [42] but facilitate (smart contract) maintenance.
B.3. Smart Contract Support vs. Confidentiality
A trade-off exists between the use of complex smart contracts and confidentiality. This trade-off can even increase as smart contracts integrate external data feeds. In general, the execution of smart contracts on a distributed ledger is triggered through transactions, which are sent to the address of the smart contract. Transactions are stored on the underlying distributed ledger and are associated with the account of the transaction issuer. Thus, it is publicly transparent which account triggered a smart contract [82] . The byte code of smart contracts is also visible to the public. Smart contracts can be decompiled to retrieve the human readable source code. Thus, the history of issued transactions to a smart contract can reveal the current state of the smart contract. Even values of variables, which are declared private, can be assumed due to the transparent smart contract code and transaction contents [82] . Hence, the conventional use of smart contracts does not support confidentiality. Nevertheless, there are approaches for private smart contracts as, for example, proposed in the HAWK framework [82] . In HAWK, smart contracts are divided into a private and a public part. The private part determines the payout distribution among parties, which trigger the smart contract, where the input data (e.g., a number of coins) is kept private and is protected using zero knowledge proofs [82] . Thus, no other party, who triggers the smart contract, knows the input data other parties sent to the smart contract 2 . Similar issues concerning confidentiality, which result when using a third party, can be found in the off-chain interoperability of DLT designs with oracles. There are currently two predominant options to retrieve data from oracles: via HTTP or InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). HTTP requests cannot be directly made from a smart contract (e.g., in Ethereum). Therefore, relays are used to retrieve data from oracles. Relays are predominantly centralized instances that forward certain data, for example, in Provable and Oraclize [118] or TownCrier [166] . For the use of IPFS, interfaces have been integrated into several DLT designs (e.g., Ethereum). The use of HTTP and IPFS in DLT require a trusted party, which stores the requested data. Thus, the oracle provider can have insights into data flows that are made by users who trigger a smart contract. Although requests may be (partially) executed in a protected SGX enclave (e.g., in TowCrier [166] ), there is at least the risk of a leaked key that can be used to decrypt the respective data.
C. Law & Regulation vs. Anonymity
C.1. Auditability vs. Transaction Content Visibility
Assets in DLT are referenced in different types of tokens (i.e., equity, utility, or security tokens) [107] , where equity tokens are predominantly used in cryptocurrencies. In distributed ledgers using equity or security tokens, it is crucial to be able to determine the current assets (e.g., number of coins) in the system to discern their value. Strong encryption of transactions, which are used to keep the user owned assets private, enables a low level of transparency but impedes auditability. Hence, the total number of equity tokens becomes hard to determine.
D. Law & Regulation vs. Security
D.1. Governance vs. Integrity
Especially after the incident of the DAO in 2016 [168] , a controversial discussion evolved within the blockchain communities whether results of security breaches should be reversable or not [65, 152] . Resetting a ledger's transaction history in a public, unpermissioned distributed ledger (e.g., Ethereum) requires a process where node controllers need to vote for or against a hard fork and, subsequently, miners should update client code according to the voting results (e.g., [172] ). During the process of a hard fork, the number of miners that participate in the original chain decreases, while the number of miners on the new chain increases. In DLT designs that reach consensus based on shares of computational power (e.g., hashing power), the total shares of the original network decrease while the total share in the new branch of the distributed ledger increases. Due to the rapid changes in the shares, especially distributed ledgers that base on PoW become more vulnerable to attacks on integrity (see chapter 2.4.1), if no protective measures have been applied beforehand.
D.2. Governance vs. Level of Decentralization
In contrast to traditional governance models where decision rights are organized hierarchically, DLT changes the governance (e.g., the agreement on policy or protocol updates), due to its distributed nature [14] . In public, unpermissioned DLT designs, disagreement on to-be-appended data is represented as forks that are resolved in accordance with the applied consensus mechanism [14] . Public, unpermissioned DLT designs inhibit the use of traditional governance with strict roles and permissions that are used for decision making on policy updates. By applying permissions to the DLT design, a hierarchy between nodes is created (e.g., validating nodes and storage-only nodes). Thus, the level of decentralization (see Figure 2 ) decreases, and traditional, centralized governance becomes better applicable to the DLT design [160] .
E. Performance vs. Performance
E.1. Block Creation Interval vs. Stale Block Rate
As the block creation interval becomes smaller in forkable DLT designs, the transactions can be faster committed to the distributed ledger. However, after a new block has been mined, other nodes are not immediately aware of the newly mined block and keep on mining an already deprecated block. Ideally, each node stops mining an already mined block immediately to save computational resources. However, each node must first receive the new block, before it stops mining on it. Due to propagation latency, nodes might receive the new mined blocks late. During that period, the node mines on a stale block. Therefore, the stale block rate heavily depends on the block interval and the block sizes [49] . Thus, smaller block creation intervals increase the probability of stale blocks [49] , the stale block rate, and cause computational inefficiency.
F. Performance vs. Security
F.1. Block Creation Interval vs. Level of Decentralization
In public DLT designs, where mining is performed to obtain a certain reward, a long block creation interval decreases the frequency of reward payouts and decreased likelihood of rewards for individual miners. This contributes to high variance in received payments for miners. Hence, it is more likely that nodes will join mining pools to increase the probability to receive rewards from mining [36, 151] . A mining pool is a union of miners, who share mining rewards if one of these nodes receives the mining reward. Thus, the probability to receive some coins increases for each node. Simultaneously, the formation of mining pools decreases the level of decentralization of a distributed ledger [151] .
F.2. Throughput vs. Consistency
An increased block size comes with a longer block propagation delay [50, 54, 160] resulting in a longer state of inconsistency between nodes in a distributed ledger [33, 153] . For Bitcoin and Ethereum it was found that the percentage of separately mined blocks, which are successfully committed to the blockchain's main chain, becomes low as the block size and the block propagation delay increase [54] , which is why the stale block rate increases. Due to the increased stale block rate, inconsistent views on the ledger are provided by multiple nodes until the forks are resolved. Such inconsistent states, in turn, support successful attacks (see chapter 2.4.1). Thus, forkable DLT designs based on PoW can only improve the transaction throughput by degrading consistency (and increasing vulnerability) [13] .
F.3. Throughput vs. Fault Tolerance
In blockchains, the requirement for high throughput is predominantly met by applying finality-preserving consensus mechanisms where a small set of nodes participates in the transaction and block validation process such as PBFT [24] . In such consensus mechanisms, the number of nodes n determines the message complexity for the synchronization of the nodes' states in O(n 2 ) (for DPoS and PBFT). Thus, finality comes at the cost of the level of decentralization of the distributed ledger and its fault tolerance. For example, cryptocurrencies thrive in a highly adversarial environment and, thus, demand for a high level of fault tolerance, which is closely related to a high level of decentralization. A high level of decentralization requires a large number of diverse participants in a distributed ledger to increase availability, resilience, and integrity [105] . In the case of cryptocurrencies, fault tolerance is prioritized above all other DLT properties such as performance and flexibility. For example, the Bitcoin blockchain achieves throughput of only 10 transactions per second and a transaction takes on average of 10 min to be committed [109] . Nevertheless, Bitcoin is fault tolerant to up to 50 % of faulty miners [109] . In contrast, PBFT achieves high throughput of thousands of transactions per second but tolerates only f = |R|−1 3 faulty nodes f in a set R of validating nodes in the distributed ledger [24] .
F.4. Throughput vs. Integrity
For the DLT concept blockchain it was found that an increased block size can increase throughput because more transactions can be conveyed per block [54] . In distributed ledgers using blocks, block propagation delays are strongly influenced by block size [33, 160, 162] and bandwidth [128] . Thus, the increased throughput comes with longer block propagation delays that result in a higher probability of forks [160] . The resulting forks increase the probability of successful attacks on the integrity of the distributed ledger [65] , which enable to (partially) rewrite the history of stored transactions (see chapter 2.4.1). It has been shown for blockchains that a longer block creation interval increases resilience of a DLT design towards forks and resulting attacks such as selfish-mining [48, 49] , long-range attacks [34] , bribery attacks [15] , or other attacks that base on forks (e.g., 51 % attack) [34] . Furthermore, highly varying loads on the distributed ledger caused by variations on transaction frequency result in block size variations, which cause variations in the block propagation delay in the network [71] . Variations in the block propagation delay increase the probability of successful selfish-mining attacks thereby threatening security [44, 53] . Thus, the likelihood that a set of malicious nodes, which perform selfish-mining, can revert the transaction history increases. Consequently, the increased block size increases vulnerability towards attacks on the integrity of data stored on a distributed ledger.
F.5. Throughput vs. Level of Decentralization
One major technological drawback inherent to current public blockchains pertains to the issue of throughput. This means that current public blockchains, for instance, Bitcoin or Ethereum, are unable to handle transactions in the thousands per second [73] . Nevertheless, public DLT designs come with the requirement to include thousands of nodes into the distributed ledger. Therefore, the applied consensus algorithms such as PoW or PoS are predominantly designed to reach consensus across multiple nodes with a comparably high (Byzantine) fault tolerance. Each node is included into consensus finding, which is why consensus mechanisms for highly decentralized distributed ledgers only provide probabilistic finality [146] . In contrast, faster consensus mechanisms can be applied using, for example, PBFT [24] or PoA [5] . Such consensus mechanisms provide finality in consensus finding but can only include a comparatively small set of validating nodes due to exhaustive communication effort [106, 145, 146] . Commonly, consensus mechanisms providing finality are applied in permissioned DLT designs where only a selected subset of nodes participates in consensus finding and other nodes merely store replications of the distributed ledger. In current consensus mechanisms for public DLT designs, the level of decentralization decreases to achieve an increase in throughput, for example, GoChain's PoR, which builds upon PoA and allows only selected organizations to run a validating node [55] . Hence, increased throughput often comes at the cost of the level of decentralization. Nevertheless, there are consensus mechanisms that apply special derivates of PBFT to public, unpermissioned DLT design (e.g., Tendermint [2] , EOS [43] ), where a set of nodes is randomly chosen to reach consensus based on the particular stake of particular nodes. However, this still centralizes decision making to a subset of nodes.
G. Security vs. Security
G.1. Confidentiality vs. Integrity
To preserve confidentiality, DLT designs are often implemented in a closed, private network, where only particular nodes can join (private, unpermissioned DLT designs), for example, the private Ethereum blockchain or HyperLedger Fabric. However, a small number of known nodes makes it easier to have detailed information on the network topology. Access to a detailed network topology facilitates initiation of targeted delays in the communication between nodes because the data flow is known [111] . Thus, the probability for successful balance attacks [111] increases in forkable DLT designs such as Ethereum, which violates a distributed ledger's immutability. Increased vulnerability for immutability violations reduces the integrity of a distributed ledger.
G.2. Consistency vs. Availability
Distributed systems theory reveals a trade-off between consistency and availability-the CAP Theorem [1, 50] . This trade-off also persists in the field of DLT and is caused by latency in block propagation, for example, due to big block sizes or network failures. The larger the number of nodes that must receive new transactions, the longer the distributed ledger is in an inconsistent state. The larger the number of nodes of a distributed ledger, the more time it takes until each node has received the new block. However, many replications of the data stored on the distributed ledger increases availability. Thus, there is a trade-off between high availability and fast consistency.
G.3. Level of Decentralization vs. Consensus Latency
A high level of decentralization implies a large network of individually maintained nodes. In turn, the number of nodes which participate in the consensus mechanism strongly affects the consensus latency [106, 160] . Consensus finding between validating nodes is hard to achieve, especially, under consideration of Byzantine failures. In public, unpermissioned distributed ledgers participation of a high number of independent nodes in the consensus finding is required to prevent the distributed ledger from Byzantine failures. If strict timeouts would be applied, the distributed ledger would become more vulnerable to routing attacks that cause network partitions due to, for example, BGP hijack attacks [7] . However, a high level of decentralization increases the consensus latency dramatically because agreement (e.g., all nodes choose the same block) and termination (e.g., all nodes eventually choose a block) in consensus finding cannot be reached at the same time in asynchronous systems. Thus, consistency and synchronicity must be relaxed in public, unpermissioned DLT designs to achieve liveliness in a distributed ledger with a high level of decentralization.
G.4. Level of Decentralization vs. Integrity
As the network size increases (in public, unpermissioned DLT designs) due to additional nodes, which are individually controlled, it becomes unlikely that participating node controllers have the same intentions or even know each other (in the real world). Hence, the level of decentralization increases on both the controller side and architectural side as the number of separate nodes increases (see Figure 2) . The presence of a consortium or majority of the same interest that takes control of the distributed ledger with a majority of at least 51 % of the overall hashing power becomes unlikely, which strengthens the integrity of the respective DLT design. Nevertheless, consensus mechanisms in large public, unpermissioned DLT designs predominantly engage probabilistic finality to increase responsiveness (e.g., PoW, PoS). In contrast, private, unpermissioned DLT designs incorporate a small number of identifiable (trusted) nodes. Hence, the level of decentralization decreases on the controller side. Due to the usually small number of nodes in a private DLT design, the overall level of decentralization of the distributed ledger decreases. Given that a consensus mechanism is applied that assures probabilistic finality, the likelihood of successful tampering with the data stored in a distributed ledger increases. Each node of a private DLT design has increased influence in the distributed ledger which increases vulnerability towards, for example, the blockchain anomaly [110] . Thin nodes, which only store parts of the distributed ledger, must assume that miners verify all blocks and follow an incentive mechanism when mining. Otherwise thin nodes risk to accept invalid transactions [150] . Endusers who only retrieve data from the distributed ledger and do not maintain an own mechanism to verify the distributed ledger's integrity cannot be sure that the distributed ledger's transaction history has not been tampered with [42] . In permissioned DLT designs where only a subset of nodes is permitted to validate transactions and issue new blocks the level of decentralization of a distributed ledger decreases although the number of total nodes of the distributed ledger might be bigger than in private networks. However, permissioned networks (and small private, unpermissioned networks) can make use of consensus mechanisms that preserve total finality (e.g., PBFT). After total finality has been reached among the validating nodes, committed transactions cannot be changed retroactively. Thus, the trade-off between level of decentralization and integrity predominantly refers to DLT designs that make use of only probabilistic finality.
H. Security vs. Usability
H.1. Level of Decentralization vs. Cost
In public, unpermissioned DLT designs, which apply probabilistic finality, the level of decentralization is important to assure integrity of the stored data. Thus, arbitrary nodes are permitted to join the distributed network and to participate in the mining process. This leads to an eventually increasing number of nodes in the distributed ledger, which must all validate the issued transactions. Furthermore, in public, unpermissioned DLT designs PoW is often applied to prevent sibling attacks and resulting denial of service, for example, in Bitcoin [109] , Ethereum [22] , and IOTA [127] . Therefore, the total computational effort for the distributed ledger increases while transaction rate is assumed constant. To regulate the computational effort, public, unpermissioned DLT designs apply an economic incentive mechanism which rewards nodes for their share of resources [160] . The economic rewards result in a pricing structure which is linked to the computational efforts. The pricing structure expects transaction issuers to pay a certain amount of assets (e.g., coins) for the transaction processing. In contrast, PBFT is unsuitable for many validating nodes and, thus, for a high level of decentralization as it requires each node to agree on a certain state to reach total finality. However, PBFT is less costly than PoW due to less required computational resources [106] . There is no mining in PBFT, which is why DLT designs that make use of PBFT come without the necessity of an extrinsic incentive mechanism (e.g., mining rewards) and there is no need to pay transaction fees. High availability is reached by a high number of replications of the ledger on separated nodes, which relates to the level of decentralization as the number of nodes should be physically distributed to decrease the likelihood of system failure. Reducing cost by reducing the number of nodes results in a reduction of the number of replications of the distributed ledger and weakens availability. A high number of replications is currently reached in public, unpermissioned blockchains because any node can join the distributed ledger. However, public blockchains also come with transaction fees in contrast to private or permissioned blockchains [113, 132] resulting in higher overall cost for users. In public, unpermissioned DLT designs, transaction fees can constantly change, which makes it difficult to predict cost when using a public DLT design for applications [125] . In contrast, private DLT designs such as Hyperledger Fabric [4] lack transactions fees, which makes them cheaper to use. Cost become more predictable compared to public, unpermissioned DLT designs. However, private DLT designs usually come with less availability than public DLT designs. Additional cost emerges from interoperability between such private DLT designs and public DLT designs (e.g., to make payments), for example, if intermediaries such as notaries are employed to coordinate transactions between the respective distributed ledgers.
H.2. Level of Encryption vs. Support for Constrained Devices
The level of encryption of a DLT design results from the degree of security and performance of algorithms for the generation of public, private key pairs (e.g., to secure authentication), for content encryption (e.g., to increase confidentiality), and for hash value calculation (hashing). For public key encryption it is important that public, private key pairs are unique and cannot be guessed, while the algorithms time complexity is important for encrypting/signing of data and for decryption/verification. Several DLT designs encrypt transactions to increase confidentiality, for example, in Zcash [66] the zk-SNARK protocol is applied to encrypt and still validate transaction [165] . In addition to time complexity in public, key encryption, the applied hash algorithm implies a likelihood for collisions, that is, different inputs produce the same hash value as a respective outcome [11] . Low collision likelihood is desirable which is why a high level of encryption is targeted. An increased level of encryption requires more computational resources such as RAM and storage memory [100] . Thus, constrained devices such as microcontrollers can only hardly handle resource-intensive encryption [83, 100] .
H.3. Fault Tolerance vs. Response Time
In distributed systems, Byzantine fault tolerant consensus mechanisms come with an inherent trade-off between robustness and responsiveness [105] . To cope with crashed nodes, weak synchronicity [39, 105] is applied, where the system designer makes timing assumptions on network delays to guarantee that the system will respond within a defined timeframe. A node is assumed as failed, if the respective node did not respond within a specific timeframe, which is defined by the timing assumption [39] . In DLT designs such as Bitcoin and Ethereum [109] , where the number of nodes is unknown, the timing assumption is expressed by the block creation interval [124] , which prevents nodes from mining too long on stale blocks. Due to the weak synchronicity assumption in the respective consensus mechanism, the block creation interval strongly depends on the assumed block propagation time [123] . To minimize the number of forks and to retain security, the block creation interval must be set to a constant factor, which is large enough to minimize the stale block rate and small enough to reach enough throughput. If the block creation interval is set too short, fault tolerance decreases due to too many forks; however, new blocks are faster confirmed. On the other hand, if the block creation interval is set too long, confirmation latency enlarges because it takes more time to append a sufficient number of blocks to assume the respective block to be confirmed. In PBFT and consensus mechanisms that adopt PBFT [24] (e.g., DPoS), timing assumptions must be well balanced. If the timing assumption is too short, too many nodes would be considered as failed, which weakens robustness of the underlying security model. If the timing assumption is too long responsiveness decreases and the change of the primary in the PBFT [24] may proceed too late.
I. Transparency vs. Flexibility
I.1. Unidentifiability vs. Maintainability
Unidentifiability increases in a public and unpermissioned DLT design because nodes must not be verified before joining the distributed ledger. Eventually, it is even not known how many nodes actually maintain the distributed ledger. On the other hand, updates of DLT client code must be accepted by the majority of nodes in the whole network to keep compatibility after a hard fork and guarantee up-to-dateness [163] . It is hard to maintain the usually large number of nodes in public, unpermissioned distributed ledgers, which decreases maintainability [160] . In contrast, permissioned, private DLT designs, are better maintainable because each node must be verified and is verified before joining the distributed ledger. Since each participating node is known and the number of validating nodes in the distributed ledger is usually small, maintenance of the nodes is easier, which results in a higher level of flexibility.
J. Transparency vs. Performance
J.1. Unidentifiability vs. Throughput
The less a network is controlled by a central authority and the more nodes participate in the network, the more obfuscated is the particular identity of nodes. Therefore, public, unpermissioned distributed ledgers promise increased unidentifiability than permissioned ones. In contrast, a smaller network with verified and identifiable nodes allows for higher throughput because faster consensus algorithms can be used (e.g., Byzantine Fault Tolerance). Moreover, unidentifiability can be improved by applying additional processes like mixing and the use of new keypairs for each transaction [170] . These processes create overhead due to preprocessing of each transaction, which results in decreased transaction validation speed.
K. Transparency vs. Usability
K.1. Node Verification vs. Ease of Node Setup
Identification of nodes and verification of node permissions is required in permissioned DLT designs [160] . After permissions are granted to a node, the node can participate in voting-based consensus mechanisms, such as PBFT [24] , PoA [5] , or PoET [70] . Due to the need to verify nodes to check permissions, there is a need for a trusted certification authority in the public key infrastructure which issues certificates to respective nodes and verifies the nodes' identities [64] . The need for a public key infrastructure produces additional efforts to obtain a certificate for the public, private key pair and the resulting dependency on a trusted certification authority. Due to the additional processes for the verification of a node identity, it becomes more complex to set up a node and to eventually participate in the distributed ledger. Thus, usability decreases.
K.2. Unidentifiability vs. Support for Constrained Devices
To achieve unidentifiability among users of a DLT design additional resources are required in terms of computational power, storage space, and computing time [92] . Due to the increased resource requirements, DLT designs that provide a high level of unidentifiability decrease support for constrained devices. For example, additional data structures can be used to increase unidentifiability but require additional storage size [79, 92, 128] . Another possibility to achieve unidentifiability is the application of additional processes such as mixing [97, 170] , which however also decrease the DLT design's support for constrained devices.
Drawbacks of DLT Designs for Applications on DLT
Based on the previously presented trade-offs between DLT characteristics, Figure 3 illustrates the identified trade-offs on the DLT property layer. According to the identified trade-offs on the DLT property layer, we introduce six archetypes of DLT designs to illustrate and to consolidate the previously presented trade-offs. The archetypes indicate drawbacks for applications on DLT that come from the choice of a DLT design, which is optimized towards a particular DLT property. As the community property features desirable DLT characteristics for each archetype, we do not introduce a community archetype. The transparency archetype equals a system of as little as possible confidentiality, which is, for example, in Bitcoin exemplified (except of pseudonymity). Thus, we decided to introduce the opposite as an anonymity archetype, where implications deem more complex due to multiple additional processes and factors that must be considered Anonymity Archetype. To reach anonymity, additional processing of transactions is necessary (e.g., mixing, heavier encryption). These processes are time-consuming and require additional computational power, which slows down performance. A high level of decentralization supports anonymity, but increases consensus latency and, thus, consistency. From the governance perspective, auditability is deteriorated because transactions cannot be traced, and issuers and receivers of a transaction cannot be identified. The anonymity archetype does probably not offer the use of smart contracts because smart contracts pose a threat to confidentiality and ease the identification of transaction issuers. The anonymity archetype is predominantly found in public, unpermissioned ledgers, where multiple cryptographic techniques are applied (e.g., blind signatures, stealth addresses, zero knowledge proofs) to make it as hard as possible to assign transactions to their issuers or receivers or to reveal transaction contents. Popular representatives for the anonymity archetype are Dash [41] , Monero [136] , and Zcash [66] . In Dash, additional fees must be paid if a transaction should be issued privately, which decreases usability in terms of cost. Furthermore, Dash still allows to see the transaction recipient. In Monero, ring signatures are applied to obfuscate the identity of involved parties by data of their wallets [137] . However, Monero has been criticized for vulnerabilities that eventually allow to trace transactions [108] . Although Zcash does not obfuscate IP addresses of clients, it is currently considered the most confidentiality-preserving DLT design (especially when using it over the TOR-network). Applications with a strong requirement for anonymity should handle most of their advanced business logics off-chain because anonymity DLT designs probably provide only poor performance and development flexibility. Due to the immutability of stored data, there is a threat of revealing encrypted content as technology evolves. To reach anonymity using the proposed DLT designs, additional requirements should be met (e.g., the use of TOR browser [37] in Zcash) by the developers of an application on DLT.
Flexibility Archetype.
A high level of flexibility of a DLT designs can be achieved through a large support of smart contracts, a high degree of maintainability, and off-chain as well as cross-chain interoperability. Smart contract support in the flexibility archetype requires Turing completeness, which can be executed independent from the underlying operating system (e.g., by using a virtual machine). The more expressive supported programming languages for smart contract development are, the more software errors may be exhibited by smart contracts. Smart contract code is hard to review and to test, especially, with respect to chained execution (which come with cross-function race conditions) and error handling (e.g., out-of-gas errors) [9, 35, 58, 156] . Hence, smart contracts can increase the risks for security breaches. Most common vulnerabilities in smart contracts can be exploited through re-entrance attacks (e.g., the DAO attack [168] ) and underflow attacks. As smart contracts serve as a backend for applications on DLT, smart contracts should be maintainable with only small efforts. Due to the immutability of a DLT design, smart contract code itself cannot be modified post hoc. Thus, smart contract parts that require maintenance often should be deployed off-chain and called from the respective smart contract. However, the extensive integration of off-chain services deters anonymity and may form a bottleneck in the performance of the distributed ledger. Furthermore, a high degree of maintainability is supported by a small number of validating nodes, which is crucial to adopt engineering choices to evolving technologies and to assure security towards even new attacks (e.g., quantum resistance) [142] . Examples for DLT designs, which are oriented towards the flexibility archetype are Corda [20] , EOS [43] , HyperLedger Fabric [69] , Tendermint [2] , and Tezos [57] . All of these DLT designs require only a small portion of nodes to adopt policy updates. EOS and Tezos, as public DLT designs, apply governance mechanisms such as voting to democratize policy updates, which reveals a dependency between the level of decentralization and additional requirements for governance mechanisms to improve maintainability. Frameworks such as Qtum [130] that synthesizes the reliability of Bitcoin, Smart Contract capabilities of Ethereum can accelerate and facilitate the development of more secure smart contracts and can add new features (e.g., simple payment verifications [32] ). Thus, the use of frameworks such as Qtum can increase flexibility, performance, security of applications on DLT. For example, Qtum aims at sociotechnical application suitability and offers the use of smart contract template libraries that have been developed following best practices to prevent security breaches of flawed smart contracts (e.g., [32, 58, 168] ). Applications on DLT, which make heavy use of smart contracts in their business logics and, thus, require frequent updates on smart contracts, should be intensively tested, before deployed, to prevent severe threats such as out-of-gas conditions and wallet griefing [58] (see chapter 2.4.2). Alternatively, automated audits of deployed smart contracts can be conducted to identify possible threats for users [58] . Consequently, the development of such applications becomes costly and time consuming. Furthermore, maintenance efficiency must be considered because additional transaction cost may come up due to consensus finding on policy updates.
Law & Regulations Archetype. Compliance with laws and regulations requires a high level of auditability and governance. Auditability requires visibility of transaction contents and linking of transaction to users, which requires a distributed ledger to be transparent. The level of compliance of any system always depends on current standards and regulations. Standards and regulations can be changed, and systems must adapt to changes to retain their level of compliance, which contradicts with the inherent DLT characteristic integrity. Due to the high level of integrity the retroactive adaptation of a distributed ledger to reach compliance becomes hard. For example, it is not possible to become compliant with the requirements imposed by the EU General Data Protection (GDPR) [28] , if personal data was stored on a distributed ledger as GDPR demands for a possibility to delete personal user data completely. Therefore, a high level of compliance rules out a high degree of integrity and demands for efficient implementation of new policies. To be compliant with, for example, GDPR and to increase flexibility to adapt applications on DLT to future laws and regulations, developers must weigh which data should be stored on-chain or off-chain [6, 28] . Then, off-chain data is administrated by a trusted third party or the user herself. When data should be retrieved from external data sources, off-chain interoperability and dependencies from external data providers must be considered. Nowadays, there are multiple DLT designs, which offer techniques for data auditing and governance. For example, in EOS the governance is maintained by establishing jurisdiction and choice of law along with other mutually accepted rules. This is usually done via the legally binding constitution. Every single transaction in EOS must include the hash of the constitution to the signature, which binds the users to the constitution. Compliance and DLT are highly discussed because it has not been clarified how to provide a decent level of flexibility to become compliant with future regulations and to make use of the high level of integrity of DLT at the same time (e.g., [28] ). Hence, personal data is predominantly stored off-chain and is administrated by a trusted third party or on the users' terminal devices using homomorphic encryption or zero-knowledge proofs to eventually protect data from malicious storage providers. Nevertheless, off-chain storage of data deters the level of decentralization of the particular application on DLT. Obviously, reliable interoperability of DLT designs with oracles becomes important for this archetype. Furthermore, the oracles themselves must also be compliant with the same laws and regulations. As a result, the efforts related to compliance can increase as DLT is used.
Performance Archetype. High performance requires the largest possible number of transactions per second and degree of scalability. To achieve that goal, a minimal message complexity of the employed consensus algorithm and encryption technique is necessary. Additionally, a smaller number of validating nodes speeds up system throughput while integrity is preserved due to finality. Yet, a smaller number of nodes decreases availability of a DLT and requires a higher level of trust towards validating nodes. This requires either verification of nodes and, hence, the loss of their anonymity or the adoption of hybrid consensus mechanisms such as Tendermint [2] , which are also considered rather centralized. During the last decade, multiple DLT designs have been developed targeting high performance, for example, HyperLedger Fabric [69] , IOTA [127] , and GoChain [55] . Nevertheless, the named examples come with a small level of decentralization. HyperLedger Fabric makes use of a variant of PBFT, which is, per design, not scalable so that only a small number of validating nodes can be included [106] . The tangle of IOTA makes use of a so-called coordinator [127] , which validates and appends new transactions, and decreases its level of decentralization. Another practical approach to increase performance, especially scalability, is sharding, where multiple distributed ledgers exist in parallel and are connected with each other (e.g., in Zilliqa [147] , Wanchain [98] ) [38, 99] . Sharding requires interoperability between the DLT designs, which brings more complexity to the distributed ledger but also better maintainability of the particular distributed ledger. Applications, which require a high performance DLT design must come along with a limited level of decentralization or increased complexity due to sharding. New consensus mechanisms are in the making (e.g., -differential agreement [139]), which scale proportional to the number of nodes in the network (e.g., seele [139] ). These consensus mechanisms are promising but not tested yet. Applications that build upon the performance archetype are likely to be applicable in consortiums of organizations due to the low level of decentralization, where fault tolerance decreases. Additional contracts should be made to make organizations liable for malicious intents on the shared distributed ledger, due to the low level of decentralization. Furthermore, additional offers of this type of DLT design (e.g., light clients) should correspond to the capacity of the terminal devices (e.g., computing power, storage), which should be employed in the targeted system to eventually develop and operate viable applications on DLT.
Usability Archetype. This type of DLT offers a maximum level of usability to users. The usability archetype is predominantly suitable for applications that need low response time, support for constrained devices, and low transaction cost. Furthermore, the management of a public, private key pair should be made easy and secure for the user, which is why the provision of secure tools for the organization of the users' public and private keys is crucial. There is an inherent trade-off in distributed systems between robustness and responsiveness [45, 105] . As the response time of the usability archetype should be short, robustness is decreased due to only eventual consistency. To make applications on DLT capable for constrained devices, a full replication of the ledger on each device should be avoided, for example, because of constrained storage size. Thus, the usability archetype should offer the technical foundation for the use of light nodes. However, light nodes do not contribute to increased availability or resilience of the distributed ledger because they do not store a full replication of the ledger. Public, unpermissioned DLT designs incentivize nodes to share resources with monetary mechanisms. Hence, the usability archetype comprises predominantly private DLT designs with no transaction fees. Applications that build upon the usability archetype DLT design must consider the digital key management. In contrast to centralized systems, which offer a "restore password" function, private keys cannot be recovered. In the case a user loses her private key, the respective assets cannot be accessed anymore. Thus, besides the DLT characteristics, the offer of secure wallets to store the digital key pairs is important to increase usability of a DLT design. Another option for digital key management is the integration of a trusted third party, which offers a fiduciary safekeeping.
Security Archetype. High security in DLT is supported by increasing network size due to more replications of the ledger, excluding possibly fraudulent nodes, and reducing flexibility for possibly flawed smart contracts. The DLT design should be highly available because there is no single point of failure, highly resilient towards attacks on the integrity of stored data, and be immune to developers' failures (e.g., flawed smart contracts). Obviously, these goals contradict and cannot be reached at the same time. For instance, the unidentifiability of nodes is decreased to prevent attacks by fraudulent nodes. Thus, there is a trade-off within the security archetype that reveals two different security models: first, security by openness and, second, security by permissions. The first model, security by openness, achieves security in terms of high availability through the employment as much as possible nodes of equal permissions. This model sacrifices availability for integrity and confidentiality. Integrity is deterred because the high number of nodes of public, unpermissioned DLT designs cannot be synchronized by total finality-preserving consensus mechanisms but make use of consensus mechanism that only reach probabilistic finality. Furthermore, a sufficient level of decentralization must be guaranteed to deem integrity of such public, unpermissioned DLT designs given. This level of decentralization can only be provided Archetypes by a very big number of nodes that participate in the mining process. Due to the high level of decentralization, confidentiality of stored data is decreased. The second security model, security by permissions, predominantly employs consensus mechanisms that reach finality, which is why integrity is more likely. Also, better confidentiality can be reached because data is only replicated across nodes that are verified. However, the level of decentralization decreases dramatically, which is why the particular participants have more impact in the consensus finding and may even drop particular transactions. There is the option to find consensus among verified nodes, while maintaining a replication of the ledger on multiple other nodes to increase availability. However, this hybrid approach decreases confidentiality and does not overcome the issues of increased influence of parties in the consensus mechanism.
The most prominent DLT design that corresponds to the security archetype (security by openness) is the Bitcoin blockchain [109] because it is highly available and exposes only little potential for flawed smart contracts. However, Bitcoin does not fulfill all the security-related DLT characteristics (e.g., confidentiality). In contrast, Solidus [25] is predominantly designed as a private DLT design, which provides confidentiality among the participants of a consortium. Applications that require a high level of security must make a compromise due to the trade-offs within security. An application should be built upon a public, unpermissioned DLT design to achieve high availability, a high level of decentralization, and an open democratization of data to be appended. To preserve confidentiality the application should rather be built upon a private DLT design. However, the security archetype is probably hard to serve as an infrastructure for applications on DLT due to its low flexibility.
Discussion
Principle Findings
Our results indicate 26 trade-offs between the identified DLT characteristics (see Table 7 ) that come from dependencies between the 49 identified DLT characteristics (see Table 5 , Table 6 ). The diversity of the identified DLT characteristics put emphasizes on the complexity of DLT itself and suggest the most prevalent aspects to be considered when comparing viability of DLT designs for applications on DLT. DLT pertains with databases and distributed systems, which is why we identified traditional characteristics of both domains, for example, the database characteristics atomicity, consistency, isolation, and durability and fault tolerance as a characteristic of distributed systems. However, we identified multiple DLT-specific characteristics such as stale block rate, block size, and fault tolerance in terms of Byzantine failures [24, 109] . Several of the identified trade-offs are inherent to distributed systems, for example, the CAP theorem [18, 50] or the FLP impossibility [45] , which explains the trade-off between safety and liveness in consensus mechanisms. However, the implications of these trade-offs on DLT designs differ from commonly used distributed databases, where a known number of nodes is employed, and consensus mechanisms are predominantly crash-fault tolerant (e.g., Paxos) but not Byzantine failure tolerant (e.g., Nakamoto consensus). Although implications on system behavior that result from reconfigurations DLT characteristics of blockDAGs and TDAGs is still not investigated to the knowledge of the authors, several trade-offs appear also applicable to these DLT concepts because they have been found applicable for distributed systems in general. For example, the CAP theorem [50] , the FLP impossibility [45, 105] , and the trade-off throughput vs. level of decentralization (F.5). According to Figure 3 and Table 7 , security is the DLT property which conflicts the most with all DLT properties including itself, for example, the trade-offs confidentiality vs. integrity (G.1) and consistency vs. availability (G.2). The importance of confidentiality for companies in particular can be observed in the real world during the integration of DLT into business processes. Several companies prefer private DLT designs to keep data confidential and, thus, sacrifice availability and fault tolerance (e.g., [89] ). Therefore, a purely security oriented DLT design appears impossible to be developed. However, the trend of preferring private DLT designs over public DLT designs strongly requires universal interoperability with other DLT designs or external services to prevent being caught on a 'blockchain island' [21, 75, 94, 96] . The second most conflicting DLT property is performance. The performance archetype has also an inherent trade-off between performance-related DLT characteristics. However, this inherent trade-off block creation interval vs. stale block rate (E.1) merely pertains with the DLT concept blockchain. Consequently, the highly important DLT properties performance and security appear to exclude each other. This observation, however, cannot be confirmed in the presented archetypes as they do not exclude each other completely. For example, the flexibility archetype and the performance archetype rather support each other due to the targeted low level of decentralization. This dependency could also be found in prevalent DLT designs such as HyperLedger Fabric [4] . Drawing from Table 7 , DLT may appear as predestined to follow laws & regulations and to provide a high degree of usability. However, in the examined literature, laws and regulations were mainly discussed in terms of compliance (e.g., [6, 28, 161] ) and governance (e.g., [14, 85, 120] ), and thus future research might reveal further dependencies and resulting trade-offs. The latter, usability for end-users, was predominantly focused on key management (e.g., [90] ). Usability of applications on DLT such as wallets was still not considered to the knowledge of the authors. Referring to scientific literature on the use of applications on DLT (e.g., [10, 47, 59, 159] ) prevalent challenges in the widespread adoption of applications on DLT and in the emergence of an (at least basic) understanding of DLT for end-users to eventually raise awareness for the use of applications on DLT (e.g., the use of cryptographic keys). This impression may arise from the fact that current research is primarily concerned with the analysis of the security and performance of DLT designs. We also found that some of the identified DLT characteristics should be refined in more granularity to be applicable for suitability assessments of DLT designs for a particular application (e.g., cost, governance). For example, due to the newness of DLT and only few successful applications on DLT, the DLT characteristic cost is hard to operationalize. The reduction of cost to only transactions fees, energy consumption, and maintenance appears not sufficient [116, 126] . Because companies generally target the reduction of transaction cost through the integration of new technology, a shift of transaction cost should be considered [126] . Nevertheless, the elimination of intermediaries to reduce transaction cost will probably result in new transaction cost and new intermediaries such as, for example, developers of specialized clients or the introduction of DLT patents [140] . Furthermore, as DLT disrupts collaboration among individuals and organizations, especially the organizational, social, and socio-economic impacts of DLT must be considered in costs [126] . For example, the use of DLT in the health sector can shift flexibility and responsibility of medical data maintenance towards patients. Patients can decide who can access their medical health records in what granularity (e.g., [10, 30, 135] ). During the examination of white papers on recent DLT designs, such as GoChain [55, 56] , HyperLedger Fabric [4] , or Tendermint [2] , we recognized a shift from a pure decentralization through a high degree of openness (e.g., Bitcoin and Ethereum) towards more centralization that seems largely motivated by improvements in performance due to the employment of faster consensus finding. Nevertheless, there is much criticism on this shift specifically because it contradicts with DLT's original philosophy and sacrifices security for performance. Similarly, this shift aligns with our observation that most of the trade-offs between DLT characteristics are related to security or performance. As the corresponding archetypes even inhibit the simultaneous optimization of the DLT characteristics due to inherent trade-offs, interoperability between DLT designs (Cross-Chain Technology) turns out an important avenue for future research in the field of DLT to overcome prevalent issues in DLT (e.g., [98, 148, 157, 159] ). Research on Cross-Chain Technology is still in its infancy and is concerned with, for example, the transfer of assets from one distributed ledger to another, cross-chain oracles, or cross-chain asset encumbrance [21] . Cross-Chain Technology can increase flexibility of DLT designs and might help to mitigate the presented trade-offs through multi-chain networks, which are open for any DLT design.
Implications for Practice
The consolidation of the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics into archetypes elucidates that it is not possible to develop a one-size-fits-all DLT design that fulfills all requirements of all applications. Thus, it will be necessary to decide on a particular DLT design to develop viable applications on DLT. Our work supports the decision making for a DLT design under consideration of application requirements and DLT characteristics. Drawing from the introduced DLT characteristics, a holistic view on DLT characteristics can be obtained when a DLT design is to be selected for an application on DLT. During application requirements engineering, requirements of applications towards a DLT design can be generated and mapped to the identified DLT characteristics. Thus, the generated overview of DLT characteristics supports practitioners to define requirements for DLT designs that must be considered to develop viable applications on DLT. The impact of these drawbacks on the planned application can be assessed beforehand using the presented archetypes which support the development of more viable applications on DLT. The archetypes support an initial assessment of possible drawbacks for a particular application coming from the underlying distributed ledger and give exemplary recommendations for DLT designs that are designed towards a particular archetype. For a detailed view of the causes for such drawbacks, the described trade-offs between DLT characteristics provide rationales.
Implications for Research
Our synthesis of the four previously disconnected research streams (description, analysis, application, and guidance) on DLT serves as a bridge between the different stakeholders in DLT and, thus, contributes to a holistic view of DLT. Based on the holistic view on DLT, the impact of design decisions for applications on DLT on the particular economic, regulatory, and technical environment can be investigated, which is necessary to foresee possible potentials and risks of DLT. The description research stream on DLT is consolidated in this work with a strong focus on applications on DLT. Thus, our classification of DLT characteristics can be used to generate a common understanding of important terms in the field of DLT and their technical dependencies across researchers from, for example, economics, computer science, and jurisprudence. Drawing from the identified DLT characteristics, computer scientists are incentivized to conduct thorough analysis on the quantification of trade-offs between DLT characteristics with different configurations. Thus, our results support the development of comprehensive models and simulations of DLT designs, which has only partially been approached so far (e.g., [101, 164] ). The results of such analysis support the assessment of the influence of the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics on applications on DLT. Research on the application of DLT is supported in the decision making for a particular DLT design. Researchers and practitioners obtain deep insight into viability of DLT designs for applications on DLT and their possible impact on organizations based. Thus, research, for example, on business process innovation using DLT can draw from the trade-offs and archetypes to discuss possible negative effects of the integration of DLT. Furthermore, we contribute to research on software engineering and requirements engineering in distributed systems since a holistic view on non-functional requirements can be obtained beforehand. Finally, we support the forth research stream guidance by introducing the archetypes of DLT design. The generated archetypes can form a fundament for a preselection of DLT designs and can support the selection of an appropriate DLT design (e.g., [125] ) to make the selection of a DLT design more efficient. The integration of the identified trade-offs and generated archetypes into such decision-support processes enables the investigation of which of the identified DLT characteristics should be communicated in which way with users of the decision-support process to make decision-support processes even comprehensible for novices. Thus, a foundation for the investigation of design patterns for a comprehensive decision-support for the selection of a DLT design is provided.
Limitations
As with any study, our study has some limitations. The identified DLT characteristics were solely identified in a literature review in field the of DLT. Analyzed DLT concepts are limited to already published scientific articles and mainly focus on blockchain. Therefore, we limit our overview of DLT characteristics that are currently of particular interest in research on DLT for the development of applications. However, derived DLT characteristics can also be found in multiple white papers of DLT designs such as EOS [43] , GoChain [55] , IOTA [127] , Spectre [144] , and Tezos [57] . Most of the analyzed research articles that describe implementational work developed applications on Bitcoin [109] , Ethereum [22] , or HyperLedger Fabric [4] which makes our work (in particular the identified trade-offs) only partially generalizable to other DLT designs. Several trade-offs have been derived under consideration of scientific literature in the field of distributed systems and should be analyzed to determine their impact on applications on DLT. While we analyzed dependencies between DLT, we focused on potential negative effects and resulting trade-offs. We acknowledge that dependencies might also lead to complementary, positive effects, which might be analyzed in future research. Until the time of writing, only few papers in the research streams analysis and guidance have been published, which consider blockDAGs or TDAG. However, there are first approaches for the analysis of such DLT concepts as formalization for frameworks for the simulation of such DAGs emerged (e.g., [164] ). However, we could not identify trade-offs between DLT characteristics that are specific for such DLT concepts based on the found literature.
Future Research
We identified multiple conditions, which impact the intensity of certain dependencies or even the presence of trade-offs between DLT characteristics such as the applied consensus mechanism or the use of additional services such as mixing (e.g., regarding the trade-off unidentifiability vs. throughput (J.1)). Thus, the analysis research stream should conduct measurements to quantify the identified trade-offs between DLT characteristics under different conditions. The analysis should include other DLT concepts than blockchain to reveal dependencies between DLT characteristics for different data structures. The conduction of such analysis supports the quantification of the dependencies between DLT characteristics, which can be used to finally express the influence of the particular trade-offs between DLT characteristics. Quantified trade-offs support the development of holistic decision-support for the selection of DLT designs for applications within the guidance research stream. Based on a quantified model of the trade-offs, monitoring-systems for distributed ledgers can be developed, which can use the generated trade-offs to predict the behavior of a distributed ledger. Researchers on the application of DLT can further investigate how to design such decision-support and monitoring applications. Knowledge on how to communicate the system behavior of a distributed ledger to users of a DLT application can increase trust towards DLT. Several DLT characteristics can hardly be measured (e.g., governance, cost). Therefore, more detailed and testable criteria must be generated according to requirements of a particular application on DLT to evaluate the achievement of such DLT characteristics. In the evolvement of DLT designs, interoperability becomes obviously a crucial DLT characteristic. Especially, interoperability between DLT designs is of particular interest to increase throughput, to enable scalability, and to increase flexibility of applications on DLT [12, 21, 26, 99] . Drawing from the discussed inherent trade-offs of particular DLT designs, the effects of such trade-offs in the context of interoperability should be investigated in future research. For example, the combination of DLT designs, one providing total finality and the other only probabilistic finality, may challenge atomicity and cause a loss of transferred assets as transactions are not finalized on both ledgers. Furthermore, interoperability between DLT designs has the potential to increase security of DLT designs through merged mining using sidechains (e.g., in Rootstock [91] ). Thus, the analysis of trade-offs coming from the interoperability of DLT designs appears crucial for the development of even more flexible applications on DLT.
Conclusion
This work shows that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all DLT design due to diverse DLT characteristics and prevalent trade-offs at the current state of DLT. Because it is difficult to consider all the trade-offs and their particular impact at once, we presented archetypes of DLT designs to make the trade-offs between DLT characteristics more tangible. The generated DLT design archetypes support practitioners to understand causes of drawbacks for applications on DLT that come from the selection of a DLT design. Due to the presentation of the trade-offs and their consolidation into archetypes, the configuration of a DLT design becomes more transparent for developers, which can ultimately prevent wrong decisions for the selection of a DLT design.
